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Abstract
The  Internet  offers  opportunities  for  incremental  efficiency  gains  as  well  as
complete industry redefinition, but the marketspace has been slow to realize opportunities
due to problems with value appropriation. In this paper we focus on a particular business
activity that emerged due to the Internet: horizontal portals. We show how different strategic
industry  analysis  approaches  fail  to  provide  a  comprehensive  view  of  industries  in  the
information value system. As the different markets are intertwined, strategic market bundling
appears  as  a  superior  strategy,  and  it  is  from  this  broader  perspective  that  overall  value
appropriation opportunities have to be analyzed.
Keywords: Horizontal  portal  industry,  information  value  system,  market  bundling,  value
appropriation, value creation.MARKET BUNDLING STRATEGIES IN
THE HORIZONTAL PORTAL INDUSTRY
Introduction
New technologies, and the arrival of the Internet in particular, have shown to have a
profound impact on today’s businesses. As with almost all technological changes, the early and
most obvious changes are of an incremental nature, resulting in cost savings, as it becomes
cheaper to do things that we are already doing. More profound effects may be observed over
time, as we discover that we can do completely new things with the technology, or that the
technological  change  transforms  the  nature  of  the  businesses,  and  opens  up  new  value
proposition opportunities [6] in an industry or even creates new industries. The Internet is such
an enabling technology [23], allowing companies to influence both their demand and their
costs, while at the same time creating “value innovations” [16]. These changes are difficult to
forecast and analyze, as industries are reshaped, new markets find their equilibrium, existing
markets  shift  toward  new  ones,  and  completely  new  industries  appear  in  the  competitive
landscape. One of these new markets is the Horizontal Portal Market.
To foresee the future of an industry, as well as to forecast whether the most prominent
business  models  are  viable,  one  has  to  differentiate  between  value  creation  and  value
appropriation. Two years ago, it was believed that the disruptive nature of Internet technology
changed the fundamentals of business. A new era of competition in which none of the old
paradigms  were  valid  was  heralded.  The  collapse  of  the  technology  market  and  the  high
profile failures of many of the upstart dotcoms have shown us that the old business rules still
apply. E-businesses had shown great value propositions on the value creation side, through the
reduction of transaction costs, search costs or enhanced customization opportunities [5].
Still, value appropriation appeared to be very problematic. Although new products and
pricing  mechanisms  may  help  companies  in  appropriating  the  created  value,  recent
experience has shown that increased rivalry and constant entry of new competitors, as well as
increased market transparency, pose significant challenges to value appropriation by firms.
In this paper we focus on a particular business activity that the Internet has allowed
to emerge, horizontal portals, and try to determine whether there are, at least theoretically,
some  business  models  that  might  produce  superior  returns  and  sustainability.  After
introducing the main traits of this industry and analyzing the main value creation and value
appropriation drivers, we show that powerful challenges to long-term sustainability exist.
Three existing theories 1) product bundling, which has been argued to be a very effective
strategy for value appropriation of information goods, 2) vertical integration, which has often
been claimed to be a good way to boost efficiencies along the overall supply chain of an
industry, and 3) system lock-in, which allows the companies that master it to obtain superior
market dominance through the use of network externalities, are insufficient to carry out acomprehensive strategic analysis of this industry. We claim that in these new competitive
environments of information goods it is necessary to adopt a broader point of view that takes
into account complementary strategies carried out in different competitive markets. We call
this strategy market bundling and it appears to be emerging as a powerful road to overall
success. We will analyze the strategies of the main leading horizontal portals by introducing
the online value system [36], showing that horizontal portals are only one of the components
of  the  overall  value  delivery  system.  We  show  how  market  bundling  opportunities  have
affected in different ways the value appropriation possibilities of the main players and will
show how value creation and value appropriation occur on each of the steps by comparing
the evolution of the main players in the industry. This analysis provides evidence that a
bundled market proposition throughout the value system seems to be a superior strategy.
Finally,  we  will  conclude  with  some  conjectures  about  the  long-term  feasibility  and
generalizability of this analysis, pointing out future directions for research.
Classical Portal Strategies and Product Bundling
In the early 1990’s the first horizontal portals were born as simple search engines or
directories,  offering  Internet  users  an  efficient  way  to  filter  the  immense  amount  of
information available on the Web. 
The main initial objective of any portal is to provide a single point of access to data
and services that the user needs, or as [30] defines it, a portal is to provide an “entry point, or
homepage,  for  accessing  Internet  content  and  services,”  such  as  local  news,  weather,
entertainment, games, email, chat room, and pointing end-users to Web sites according to their
interests (see [25] for a detailed description of a portal’s offering). As [11] states, a good portal
should provide many applications, including a search-and-retrieval tool, and should help the
user by providing information that might be useful. Hence portals normally include some ways
of personalizing and organizing information. Over time, other services have been added to the
search engines, including email, chat, entertainment, games, and other information services, as
well as the possibility to customize the starting page of the portal, for example with MyYahoo!.
Since then, portals have evolved into full-service hubs of electronic commerce, mail, on-line
communities and customized news. In this way, portals have consistently been the most visited
sites on the Web (Figure 1), playing a “major role in navigating and delivering personalized
information tools and content” [24]. Portals that have evolved from search engines or shared
bookmarks, are today a major organization tool of the Internet. 
Figure 1. Internet Audiences in the US, June 2002
Parent Company Unique Audience  Reach %  Time per Person 
1. AOL Time Warner  64,423,267  61.37  0: 37: 28 
2. Microsoft  63,540,739  60.53  1: 00: 37 
3. Yahoo!  58,694,477  55.92  1: 26: 47 
4. Google  22,030,143  20.99  0: 22: 28 
5. Terra Lycos  21,222,429  20.22  0: 14: 52 
6. About-Primedia  20,082,500  19.13  0: 13: 14 
7. Amazon  19,653,434  18.72  0: 14: 27 
8. eBay  19,349,775  18.43  1: 42: 34 
9. USA Network  15,417,057  14.69  0: 17: 31 
10. Viacom Inter.  14,332,141  13.65  0: 24: 35
Source: Nielsen Ratings, 2002.
2We have to differentiate between horizontal and vertical portals [10]. Horizontal
portals have also been called consumer portals, web portals or public portals, and are generic
organizers  of  information.  In  contrast,  vertical  portals,  sometimes  also  called  specialized
portals,  enterprise  information  portals,  or  corporate  portals,  provide  information  for  a
particular group of specific interest [33].
Since  many  Web-surfers  choose  to  enter  the  Internet  through  horizontal  portals,
these companies are, in principle, in a very powerful position, giving them a huge leverage
over retailers and other firms that depend on the portals to flag their presence on the Internet.
Nonetheless, with the exception of a few portals, such as Yahoo! and AOL, these businesses
are generally not profitable. 
Value creation and value appropriation in the portal industry
In order to better understand the competitive dynamics, we will analyze the different
strategies in the horizontal portal industry from the perspective of their ability to create and
appropriate value. It is important to distinguish between these two dimensions, as sometimes
companies  do  add  value  for  their  customers  but  are  unable  to  appropriate  value  for
themselves, leading to dismal economic performance.
Value is created whenever the willingness to pay (also referred to as reservation
price) for an item or service offered exceeds the (opportunity) cost of providing that item or
service.  In the horizontal portal industry, value is certainly created through a reduction in
both transaction and search costs [4], and the creation of new customization opportunities of
information or services. By classifying and categorizing information, portals offer their users
an enhanced Internet experience, while offering opportunities for targeted advertising to their
clients.  In  addition,  portals  include  personalization  features,  such  as  providing  an  email
account, or allowing personalization of the homepage, hence increasing the value for both
their users and their clients (advertisers) even further. Figure 2 schematically depicts the basic
value proposition of a generic portal. 






















AdvertiserNonetheless, value appropriation opportunities are scarce, as they critically depend
on fees paid by advertisers. These fees have dropped drastically during the past years (see
Figure 3) and portals are facing significant challenges on the value appropriation side. 
First, rivalry among portals is intense, with large, deep-pocketed firms competing in
the general portal area and an increasing number of special-interest vertical enterprises, such
as  portals  addressing  only  women  (and  at  least  one  portal,  About.com,  that  catalogues
vertical portals), entering the market. Once such companies have invested in building the
necessary infrastructure, hence incurring high fixed costs, they compete aggressively to build
the  user-base  to  take  advantage  of  the  low  variable  costs  of  serving  new  customers.  In
addition, as imitation is easy, if a particular tactic seems to be working, there are very few
ways to keep the competition from copying it almost instantly. Thus, for example, while
Yahoo! was rapidly transforming itself from 1994 to 1998, [35] and [25] show how Excite
closely echoed many of Yahoo!’s actions. 
Figure 3. CPM evolution, 1996-2001
Second, despite efforts to increase customer loyalty though customization, switching
costs for visitors to general portals are low. Unlike several information providers, such as the
Wall  Street  Journal,  which  charges  monthly  fees  to  subscribers,  or  application  service
providers, which also charge for their services, most portals have no contract to bind users to
their site. In addition, as users become more experienced with the Internet, they may migrate
to more sophisticated or focused portals, such as vertical portals. Also, low switching costs
limit e-commerce revenue growth since users that initially purchase by passing through the
portal and generating commissions revenue may later bypass the portal and go directly to
the e-tailer’s site for future purchases, thus disintermediating the portal from the transaction
process.
Finally, technological changes often require new technological architectures or at
least the addition of new technological features to the portal. Because of low switching costs,
it is critical to manage such changes well, as delays or interruption in service may lead users
to move to competing providers. Maintaining service is complicated by the fact that many













CPM evolution (average cost)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001Increasing value appropriation opportunities through Stickiness and Product Bundling
To overcome imitation and low switching costs to other portals, firms have engaged
in a variety of strategies. First, most of the portals have pursued quick growth strategies [25]
in order to gain a cost advantage over their smaller competitors, as well as constructing a
strong brand image, which allows them to attract new visitors to their sites, increasing traffic
and  therefore  increasing  their  advertising  revenue  potential.  Firms  are  spending  large
amounts of money and resources to establish and maintain their brands. Due to the large
number  of  competitors,  it  has  become  increasingly  difficult  and  expensive  for  portals  to
obtain quality television, radio, magazine, Internet and other advertising space.
Second, portals, to be successful, have made efforts to increase their sites’ stickiness
[27; 40]. This implies keeping visitors at the site for as long as possible and convincing them to
return.  This  allows  portals  to  construct  user  profiles  and  get  information  about  the  user's
characteristics, deriving better demographic and behavioral information from users, which then
allows portals to charge higher advertisement fees. Stickiness is achieved by encouraging users
to utilize many services and products by often changing content [9, 26], providing local content,
offering customized services, and investing in branding [3]. 
Regarding  “distinctive”  content,  portals  are  making  strong  investments  to  obtain
exclusive  content  that  may  increase  customer  loyalty.  In  this  way  achieving  exclusive
contractual agreements, as observed for example during the bidding for the Internet rights of the
Soccer World Championships 2002 or Big Brother, is driving content prices up and availability
down. Hence, portals are facing additional costs. In addition, it is not clear whether users are
willing  to  pay  for  improved  content.  A  study  by  Forrester  Research  in  2001  reported  that
consumers are not very likely to pay for any type of content, although this depends on the type
of content, as people do pay for instant financial information, online games, and pornography.
Even if customers were willing to pay for content, a pricing information services problem exists
[18], as the pricing-by-replication scheme breaks down and completely new pricing schemes
have to be developed [7]. 
Still, getting exclusive content is probably not the most effective way of increasing
stickiness. On the Internet a second, increasingly important content has emerged. Portal users
produce this “content,” contained in chats, forums and discussion groups, and therefore its
production  costs  for  the  portal  owner  are  insignificant.  In  addition,  it  creates  network
externalities1 as it creates virtual communities, which in turn create stickiness [17] and hence
foster further production of more content that again will attract more traffic to the site. 
Another strategy that portals have engaged in is product bundling. As [2] point out,
“the  key  intuition  behind  the  power  of  bundling  is  that  in  many  situations  a  consumer's
valuation for a collection of goods has a probability distribution with a lower variance per
good compared to the calculation for the individual good,” and hence more value can be
appropriated through the sale of product bundles. Nevertheless, large bundles of goods have
received little attention in the literature, as most studies focus on bundles of two goods [31;
19; and 28]. A notable exception is the work done by [2], who provide a way of modeling
large bundles, arriving at the conclusion that bundling strategies can lead to a winner-take-all
5
1 “Network  externalities”  (also  known  as  “network  effects”  or  “positive  consumption  externalities”)  are
defined as value that is produced (it can be on the consumer side or the producer side) that is not directly
obtained from the product itself. Consumers get positive value from other people using the network, and
therefore value a good or service more highly as the total number of users for that good or service increases. effect as information goods that are unprofitable if sold separately can become profitable if
they are sold as part of a larger bundle. Product bundling is a strategy that has been used with
varying degrees of success by companies to extract superior rents from customers. In the
presence of different segments of customers to whom the same set of products can be offered,
if these products have negatively correlated willingness to pay (reservation prices), it can be
proven  that  product  bundling  increases  their  rents.  A  prime  example  of  this  strategy  is
Microsoft’s Office suite, as [32] point out. By bundling Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Access,
Microsoft has displaced all competition from all segments by leveraging the products that
different  customers  like.  Product  bundling  strategies  have  been  generally  applied  in  the
information  economy,  as  in  movie  distribution,  where  hits  are  bundled  with  not  so  hot
movies, or in news sales, where consumers get discounts for successive purchases.
In  the  horizontal  portal  industry  all  players  do  bundling  to  some  degree.  Basic
information provision is bundled with other services such as homepage customization, email
accounts, calendaring, instant messaging and hosting services. These bundles lock-in users,
and  increase  a  portal’s  stickiness.  Still,  most  portals  provide  these  and  other  basic
communications services free of charge to users, and have not yet found an effective means
of generating revenues from them (although some have recently started charging small fees,
especially for so-called “premium” products, like mailboxes with more space or a better web-
hosting  service).  Therefore,  product  bundling  strategies  alone  seem  to  be  insufficient  to
ensure a portal's long-term sustainability.  
Strategies to Increase value appropriation possibilities: Toward Market Bundling  
All the challenges to value appropriation discussed in the previous section have led
horizontal portals to seek new sources of revenues, abandoning the classic pure portal models
[12]. Some horizontal portals have chosen the route of offering Internet Access. Yahoo!, for
example, has teamed up with SBC to offer broadband access using DSL technologies2, and
Terra-Lycos  offers  ADSL  access  in  Spain  and  Latin  America  using  lines  from  third
companies.  Others,  like  AOL,  have  extended  their  reach  backwards  in  the  distribution
system, purchasing proprietary content by acquiring one of the leading media companies,
Time Warner, in what was the largest company merger at the time. Another fundamental
player,  Microsoft,  has  ventures  in  proprietary  content,  horizontal  portals,  access,  and
obviously operating systems and browsers. These more recent strategies have so far proven
successful in increasing the revenue possibilities of the portals that have pursued them, with
notable improvements in their profit and loss statements3.
From  a  theoretical  standpoint  these  moves  go  beyond  product  bundling,  as  they
combine product offerings from different industries (access and portal). One could see these
moves as 1) vertical integration, or 2) trying to achieve system lock-in [14]. 
In terms of vertical integration, portals entering the IAP business could be thought of
as integrating forward, just as IAPs can play the role of a distribution channel for the portal
content.  The  strategy  literature  [29;  13]  describes  a  number  of  reasons  why  companies
engage in forward or backward vertical integration. These reasons are: 1) reduce transaction
6
2 SBC is the parent company of Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, Ameritech, and SNET.
3 Yahoo! posted profits in Q2 2002 for the first time since Q3 2000, and Terra-Lycos has reduced its losses 36
per cent from 2000 to 2001 and is already the largest provider of ADSL access in Spain.costs, 2) defensive market power, like securing scarce inputs, exclusive distribution channels,
or  raising  barriers  to  entry,  or  3)  offensive  market  power,  such  as  providing  market
intelligence. None of these reasons explain why horizontal portals enter the access business,
nor  vice  versa.  Transaction  costs  are  clearly  not  reduced,  as  they  are  inexistent  between
access providers and portals, and securing scarce resources can hardly be the case, as there is
ample supply of access. In fact, one might even claim that these “diversification” moves of
portals will dilute their focus and should be contrary to their interests. In a similar way,
companies that operate in profitable markets, such as Microsoft in the operating system and
software markets, have entered clearly non-profitable markets. 
The case of system lock-in occurs when companies exert such market dominance
that  clients  are  basically  forced  to  purchase  from  them,  not  necessarily  because  of  the
intrinsic  characteristics  of  the  product,  but  because  of  the  existence  of  the  so-called
“complementors”  that  add  value  to  the  original  product  [14;  22].  Classical  examples  are
Microsoft's  Windows  and  the  Yellow  Pages  directories.  Through  smart,  and  sometimes
aggressive,  strategic  moves  Microsoft  has  a  commanding  share  of  the  operating  system
market. In this situation, software companies write new software for the Windows platform
because it is the dominant system, and users buy Windows because it has the most modern
software  available.  The  Yellow  Pages  are  in  a  similar  situation.  There  is  no  proprietary
technology to speak of, but the books with the most circulation attract more advertisers and
therefore are sought out by users, thus reaching even higher circulation. New entrants have an
extremely hard time selling ads and reaching any significant circulation. Both are examples
of what is sometimes termed indirect network effects as they leverage the power brought
about not by their own products but by the complementors. Complementors are products for
which utility to the client is positively correlated with utility for the supplier, such as software
in the Windows case and advertisers in the Yellow Pages. 
Still, the system lock-in rationale does not explain the diversification movements of
the horizontal industry. No indirect network effects are in place between portals and IAPs,
nor between portals and content providers. As a matter of fact, it might be counterproductive
to limit access to the portal to the subscribers of the proprietary IAP, as it will limit market
reach, one of the essential strategies for horizontal portals.
From this analysis, then, we contend that these theoretical approaches do not explain
why horizontal portals that have entered the access and proprietary content business have
improved their economic performance.
After the discussion in the previous sections, we consider it insufficient to conceive
of the latest moves of horizontal portals as just another way of increasing revenues; rather,
there are certain pecularities of the portal markets that make it essential for these companies to
enlarge their businesses far beyond basic access and content provision. We argue that in fact
the level of analysis has to be shifted even further, as the product bundling, vertical integration
and system lock-in explanations adopt all too narrow a view. Therefore, and following some
incipient work such as that of [2] and [15], we introduce the term market bundling, understood
as the bundling of products across different markets in the absence of negative reservation
price  correlation  and  market  dominance  reasons  for  vertical  integration.  Market  bundling
strategies impact the basic market structure and change the basic rules of competition within
each market. In this way, firms that compete in one market have to understand the competitive
dynamics of apparently unrelated markets, taking into account strategic moves of firms within
these markets. As we will show in the next section, the horizontal portal industry is one of
these markets in which a market bundling logic may apply. 
7Market bundling and the information value system
As  we  have  argued,  the  horizontal  portal  industry  is  subject  to  market  bundling
strategies, and has to take into account the competitive dynamics of markets that may seem a
priori  unrelated  to  the  portal  business.  Hence  it  is  necessary  to  analyze  the  competitive
dynamics of horizontal portals within a wider network, taking into account all necessary
players  that  are  involved  in  bringing  content  to  the  final  customer.  We  will  do  so  by
introducing the online value system, briefly depicting the main traits of involved markets, in
order to analyze how portals that are carrying out market bundling strategies are achieving
superior business propositions to those competing only as pure portals. The online value
system, described in [36], is schematically depicted in Figure 4. We favor the “value system”
nomenclature over “value chain” because each of the stages of the proposed system is an
industry in itself, as we will describe below. 
Figure 4. Some leading portals’ stock evolution
Although  horizontal  portals  and  their  complementary  businesses  of  access  and
content  providers  are  our  main  focus  of  attention,  we  will  first  quickly  describe  all
components of the model. We will do so by having a hypothetical client (or user) access a
proprietary-content provider. Her electronic commands via keyboard, touch-pad or possibly
speech will be dealt with by intermediaries along the chain, whose involvement is necessary
to fulfill the request, and who have the capability of returning the value that the user is
willing to pay for (that is, gaining the desired digitized data in useful and appealing form.
To access any information, the client must have some kind of device to connect to
the network. However, no longer does it have to be the traditional PC. Message-enabled
mobile  phones,  satellite-connected  personal  digital  assistants  (PDAs),  high-speed  game-
playing equipment, and other elaborate apparatus are being adapted to Web interchange. Such
devices consist of three basic elements: the “nuts-and-bolts” hardware itself, the operating

















































etc.software, e.g.: software that dials out, or software that downloads data from several banks to
provide a consolidated financial statement.
Linking this device to the networked universe is the local loop, which connects the
user with the Internet Access Provider (IAP)4. IAPs take the signal from the user’s computer
and route it to the Web via an access node. The signal is carried through backbones and routers
to the destination host. The user can request the information she wants by utilizing a browser
such as Netscape or Internet Explorer; finding it via a horizontal portal that consolidates third-
party content; or with progressively more ease, by going directly to the proprietary content
provider itself. A detailed analysis of each step, as well as the basic competitive strategies of the
companies operating in them, and their inter-relationships, can be found in [36]. 
Hardware, Operating System and Browser Providers
These  three  steps  of  the  value  system  are  often  overlooked  and  may  play  an
enormous role in the possibilities of value appropriation by horizontal portals, in particular
operating  systems,  which  are  subject  to  very  strong  network  externalities.  As  has  been
described  in  many  publications  [14;  39],  Microsoft’s  Windows  operating  system  has  an
extraordinary market share in the PC world, but not by being the best product for its price,
nor  by  providing  complete  customer  solutions.  Having  played  its  cards  accurately  and
locking in a large number of software developers, Microsoft has managed to maintain a
commanding  90%  market  share  of  operating  systems.  With  this  extraordinary  share,
Microsoft is assured of having its software manage the first images that a user sees when the
PC is turned on. This, together with aggressive partnership agreements with electronics and
computer superstores, has helped Microsoft to become the number two IAP in the US, with 9
million subscribers in Q3 2002, second only to AOL.
Dominating the OS step has allowed Microsoft to be the leading browser provider as
well, an “industry” where Microsoft was absent until the late nineties [8]. Although there is
no strong evidence to that effect, an eventual monopolist position at the browser step could
force portals and service providers to use particular hosting software to ensure compatibility
with an eventually non-open standard browser. Also, a complete dominance of the browser
market could hypothetically favor access to certain information sites in the same way that
game  consoles  only  run  software  from  the  same  producer.  And  finally,  having  a  strong
presence in the portal market, as MSN has achieved, may also help in pushing forward other
markets, in particular the profitable hosting software market. 
The Internet Access Providing Industry
Pure IAPs are businesses that provide services to connect individuals and companies
to the Internet. IAPs mainly generate revenue by charging user subscription fees. 
Currently  consumers  have  several  ways  to  connect  to  the  Internet  (DSL,  cable,
wireless) though most still connect through “plain old telephone service” or POTS5. In this
9
4 By and large, the local loop today is composed of a traditional twisted-pair of copper wires belonging to the
local phone company. Faster, and therefore increasingly popular, alternatives to the twisted-copper local
loop are cable television, fixed wireless (radio frequency and optical), and mobile wireless.
5 This method involves: 1) dialing up to an IAP over a modem and sending data requests over the telephone
line; 2) the IAP then sends the data request over another telephone line to the appropriate server; 3) the server
sends the requested data back to the IAP; and 4) the IAP sends the data to the individual requesting it.straightforward  stage  of  the  value  network,  then,  the  IAP’s  value  proposition  basically
consists of receiving a phone call and connecting the caller to the Internet, identifying that
caller only so as to bill him. Thus defined, an IAP is simply a bridge, using its infrastructure
to connect a user to a node of the network. IAPs provide an essential service to Internet
surfers, yet value appropriation is difficult, and only a few IAPs are profitable First, barriers
to  entry  are  low,  in  particular  for  dial-up  IAPs  because  of  the  relatively  inexpensive
infrastructure  required  to  start  providing  access.  Second,  acquiring  users  is  expensive,
requiring large investments in advertising to build brand. Third, client-switching costs are
low because there is little opportunity for pure IAPs to differentiate themselves. 
This commodity status of access6 has led to a price war in this stage of the value
chain Having to resort to cost competition, size becomes a critical factor. For instance, in the
U.S., although only 20% of IAPs operate on a national level, they generate over 80% of
the total revenue7. Large IAPs have significant economies of scale in purchasing access at
lower rates. 
Taking  advantage  of  their  brands  and  their  relationships  with  customers,  the
telecoms have established their own IAP functions. This trend has increased the pool of
providers,  which  in  turn  has  increased  the  level  of  competition.  In  addition,  along  with
telephone  firms  and  independent  IAPs,  cable  and  satellite  companies  have  become
contenders in the race to deliver broadband service, and are offering competitive alternative
ways of providing access to the Internet, increasing the price pressure further.
As most IAPs are engaged in significant branding efforts, bundling appears as a
natural way of leveraging their brand to other steps of the value network. These include
value-added services such as email (for which there is a limited willingness to pay), some
horizontal portal functions, hosting services for businesses that are migrating to the Web, and
the offering of multiple access technologies. 
Content Providers
Content providers include individuals or companies that develop and/or distribute
goods that can be digitized, such as text, data, audio, and video. For the purpose of this paper,
we will consider E-commerce providers – those individuals or organizations that trade or
facilitate trade over the Internet – as a particular kind of content provider that have a delivery
component, be it digital (like selling MP3 music files) or physical, like Amazon.com.
The  content  provider  segment,  then,  consists  of  a  large  and  varied  range  of
companies whose value proposition consists of the production and/or delivery of information,
entertainment  products,  such  as  news,  music,  and  movies,  or  information  about  physical
goods like books, records, or groceries8. 
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6 Regulation is important in determining the revenue model IAPs can pursue (see [34]). In most U.S. markets,
consumers pay a flat rate for local phone service, regardless of the number or duration of local calls. This is
referred to as unmetered service. In Europe, however, local calls are metered – on top of a flat monthly rate,
users are charged based on the total minutes of local calls made. As a result, IAPs in the U.S. may generate
revenue by charging a monthly access fee, usually around $20, while in Europe, in order not to increase the
total amount for accessing the internet, IAPs provide free access and generate revenue by taking a percentage
(from 5% to 25%) of the metered fees customers pay for the local calls made to access the Internet.
7 CyberAtlas.com, “National ISPs Still Kings of the ISP Hill,” September 28, 2000.
8 Content providers can be originators –- those who create the content, such as writers or musicians–; and or
packagers –- those that traditionally have packaged and often delivered this content, such as movie producers,
newspapers, or book publishers. In our analysis, we consider both types as proprietary content providers.As [37] has highlighted, information goods have some particularities that make their
economics special, such as defying the basic economic law of scarcity, their very high fixed
(production) costs, and their relatively minimal reproduction costs. As a consequence, profits
increase rapidly as sales increase, assuming an adequate pricing model can be applied. In
addition, there are normally no capacity limits to the production of additional copies.
This  reduced  cost  of  reproduction  and  distribution  makes  managing  intellectual
property critical [37]. In the music industry, for example, musicians and record producers are
battling to protect their property against rights to download music using MP3 and Web sites
like  Napster,  Gnutella,  Audiogalaxy  and  Kazaa.  Content  packagers  that  package  unique
content (such as books or music) are threatened with disintermediation as the changing cost
and distribution factors enable originators to bypass them. As a result, access to exclusive
content is critical in order to achieve differentiation and avoid disintermediation. Competition
for such content is intense, causing prices, and therefore barriers to entry, to rise. On the other
hand, information commodities such as CD phone books are not viable because competition
tends to push the price to marginal cost, in this case essentially zero. As a result, giving
information away on the Internet is no surprise.
To increase their revenue, content providers use price discrimination opportunities
through  versioning  [32],  bundling  [1,  2],  customized  bundling  [15],  and  micropayment
systems  [20].  These  possibilities,  together  with  allowing  users  to  selectively  choose  or
personalize  information  they  want  to  receive,  are  mainstream  facilities  for  information
providers and have evolved from being differentiating factors to strategic necessities.
Because the Internet enhances a firm’s ability to learn about individual customers,
firms can more effectively identify customer groups and offer different prices to different
segments based on their level of demand. Even if groups are difficult to identify, a versioning
strategy can be used [32]. In this case, firms can offer different versions of the same product
and customers can self-select the appropriate version based on their needs or level of interest
(e.g.:  charging  more  for  earlier  releases  than  for  later  releases  of  the  same  product,  or
charging more for full access than for limited access). 
Market Bundling in the Horizontal Portal Industry
All  main  individual  markets  of  the  online  value  system,  with  the  exception  of
operating systems, have some “industry characteristics” that make them quite unattractive,
with low long-term profit expectations. In the heady days of the Internet bubble, horizontal
portals were heralded as the gate-keepers of the Internet and were valued according to the
number of visitors they had. Since the bubble burst in March 2000, portals have been trying
to  increase  their  sources  of  revenue  by  entering  different  markets,  and  competing  with
product portfolios that go beyond the traditional production extension described in Section 2.
Figure 5 presents again the online value system with a representation of the positioning of the
different leading portals, showing how all are engaged to a greater or lesser extent in market
bundling strategies. 
11Figure 5. The online value network (Valor and Hess, 2002)
The different competitive positioning of horizontal portals highlights the difficulties
they  have  in  attaining  profitability.  Entry  barriers,  customer  switching  costs,  and  cost
differentials have traditionally been essential sources of competitive advantage throughout
many industries, and this has not changed in the Internet age. Browser developers, Internet
access providers, horizontal portals, and proprietary content generators compete in industries
that have structural deficiencies and fail to provide sustainable returns to the firms competing
in  them.  IAPs  have  relatively  low  entry  barriers  and  customers  have  essentially  zero
switching costs. Browsers must comply with open standards for communications and are
extremely hard to differentiate, with users being able to switch from Internet Explorer to
Netscape with a single download. Horizontal portals without proprietary content have very
low  stickiness,  and  are  not  able  to  retain  visitors  for  long  periods  of  time,  lowering
dramatically their possibilities to get advertising revenues. Content generators need outlets
for their products, and with the incredible myriad of distribution channels the Internet offers,
their product can get very diluted before it reaches the intended customer.
Market bundling strategies allow for synergies across different steps of the value
system, and change the main rules of each of the markets. By combining IAP activities with a
horizontal portal, proprietary content, and in some cases a browser, companies can provide
the  stickiness  of  the  content,  the  differential  speed  of  the  IAP  for  that  content,  and  the
indexing  capabilities  of  the  portal  and  browser.  If  successful,  this  strategy  will  generate
recurrent visits enabling targeted advertising in addition to the revenues of the IAP, while
greatly  increasing  switching  costs  and  making  competition  much  more  difficult  for  the
companies operating in a single step of the value system.
The success (at least temporary) of these strategies is evidenced in Figure 6, which
demonstrates that only those portals that have engaged in market bundling strategies have


































Clubs,...Figure 6. Monthly Average of Unique Visitors of Main Global Portals
The  portal  property  with  the  most  visitors  is  the  AOL-Time  Warner  group,  the
company  that  competes  throughout  the  entire  value  system,  from  browser  to  proprietary
content (including its own IAP and infrastructure from Time Cable, as well as its own portal).
We  can  say  that  AOL  follows  the  traditional  rules  of  vertical  integration:  eliminate
intermediaries, exploit economies of scope, and leverage the brand in different industries.
Also, as [29] have stated, they leverage new economy factors such as increasing network
externalities through synergies across different steps of the value chain.
Integration also allows doing bundled pricing. Users need an IAP, and they will shop
around for the best price/quality ratio. If a particular IAP provides more than just access,
including some content that the user is willing to pay for, such an IAP is likely to get the
user's access business. 
In  contrast,  those  companies  that  follow  market  focused  strategies  have  run  into
trouble. In particular, offering technology alone is not a sustainable business proposition [10].
Consider  Altavista  and  @home:  these  two  companies  competed  with  technology  in  two
different industries, search engines and broadband IAP. Their inability to be permanently the
superior technology and the lack of stickiness of their product made them disappear in the face
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9 In a very similar manner one could think that Google’s business model is very risky, as it is dependent on
the superiority of its technology. If a superior search engine appears, one could think that people would
switch to it within a few months.  At the extreme, one could consider that the most value capturing strategy would be
one that included chat and communication services within the IAP-portal bundle, making it
impossible for non-clients to access the services. This risky strategy has the most powerful
network  externalities,  and  if  a  company  could  establish  itself  as  the  largest  IAP-chat-
messaging  provider,  it  would  undoubtedly  dislodge  all  competition  and  reap  enormous
profits. Just consider Microsoft's strategy with its Messenger, Hotmail and Passport. If these
services become prevalent, one could imagine a move that made them available only to users
that switched to MSN.com as IAP, thus capturing that part of value from the system as well. 
Conclusion and Implications 
Entry barriers, customer switching costs, and cost differentials have traditionally been
essential  sources  of  competitive  advantage  throughout  many  industries,  and  this  has  not
changed  in  the  Internet  age.  Browsers,  IAPs,  horizontal  portals,  and  proprietary  content
generators  compete  in  three  industries  that  have  structural  deficiencies  and  fail  to  provide
sustainable returns to the firms competing in them. Browsers have been engaged in a browser
war and are given away for free. IAPs have relatively low entry barriers and customers have
essentially zero switching costs. Horizontal portals without proprietary content have very low
stickiness, and are not able to retain visitors for long periods of time, dramatically lowering
their ability to attract advertising revenues. Content generators need outlets for their products,
and with the incredible myriad of distribution channels the Internet offers, their product can get
very diluted before it reaches the intended customer.
Analyzing the horizontal portal industry, we have shown that traditional competitive
strategies, including product bundling, vertical integration and system lock-in, do not provide
long-term  sustainable  solutions.  Instead,  horizontals  portals  are  part  of  market  bundling
strategies within a broader value system, in which strategic actions taken in one market affect
other markets and actually may reshape an entire market structure. Hence, value creation has to
be conceived from a market bundling point of view. 
In this paper, we have only offered a first insight into this reasoning, and empirical
validation  and  generalization  has  still  to  be  done.  Nevertheless,  we  think  that  the  market
bundling logic applies to all industries in which information plays a key role, either because 1)
it is the content itself (such as the media industry), 2) it is the subject being transmitted (such as
the telecommunication industry), or 3) it is the element being processed or stored (such as the
computer and electronics industry). In the last few years, all these industries have gone through
a process of digital convergence [39], which has created a new competitive environment and
new rules for competition. In all of these industries, mergers, alliances, and acquisitions of
apparently unrelated businesses are ongoing. In future research we will show how the initial
reasoning offered in this paper may be applied to systematically analyze their interrelations. 
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